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This paper reviews the monetary transmission mechanism in low income countries (LICs). 
We use monetary transmission in advanced and emerging markets as a benchmark to 
identify  aspects of the transmission mechanism that may operate differently in LICs. In 
particular, we focus on the effects of financial market structure on monetary transmission. 
The weak institutional framework prevalent in LICs drastically reduces the role of securities 
markets and increases the cost of bank lending to private firms.  Coupled with imperfect 
competition in the banking sector, this means that banks with chronically high excess 
reserves invest in domestic public bonds or (when possible) in foreign bonds. With the 
financial system not intermediating funds properly, the traditional monetary transmission 
channels (interest rate, bank lending, and asset price) are impaired. The exchange rate 
channel, on the other hand, tends to be undermined by central bank intervention in the 
foreign exchange market. These conclusions are supported by review of the institutional 
frameworks, statistical analysis, and previous literature.  
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 I. Introduction 
 
 
  Economists have devoted a substantial amount of attention to the monetary 
transmission mechanism, but typically in the context of economies with highly 
sophisticated and well-functioning financial markets.  Much less is known about 
monetary transmission in economies with more rudimentary financial systems – not just 
quantitatively, but even qualitatively.  Consequently, the links between the central bank’s 
policy instruments and the behavior of aggregate demand in such countries remain 
something of a black box.  This situation may be acceptable from the perspective of 
policy formulation as long as those links do not change – i.e., as long as the reduced-form 
effect of monetary policy instruments on aggregate demand remain stable – but in a 
world of financial reform and financial innovation this situation is not common. 
 
  Financial development is highly correlated with income per capita.  Accordingly, 
most countries with rudimentary financial systems tend to be low-income countries 
(LICs).  Since low-income countries typically peg their exchange rates and are 
characterized by fiscal rigidities, monetary policy is often the only short-run stabilization 
instrument at their disposal.
2  A situation in which the functioning of the primary short-
run macroeconomic stabilization policy that is available to the majority of the world’s 
countries remains a black box is clearly not acceptable for policy makers. 
 
This paper is essentially an elaboration of the points made in the two preceding 
paragraphs.  It provides an overview of the ex ante reasons for believing that the 
monetary transmission mechanism in low-income countries may be fundamentally 
different from what is typically described in economies with more sophisticated financial 
systems, focusing specifically on the implications for the various conventional channels 
of monetary transmission of the financial environment that tends to characterize LICs.
3  
We conclude that there are strong a priori reasons to believe that monetary transmission 
may be both weak and unreliable in the context of LICs, and find that the existing 
empirical evidence is indeed consistent this view.
45 
                                                 
2 Monetary and exchange rate policy tend to be independent instruments in the short run in most LICs, 
because these countries generally are characterized by very limited capital mobility. 
3 Our focus is on transmission mechanisms and not on other aspects of monetary policy, 
including the broad goals of monetary policy, the choice of monetary policy frameworks, and 
coordination with fiscal policy. 
 
4 We limit our analysis to “typical” LICs.  The usual definition of LICs refers to countries with PPP-
adjusted income per capita of less than US$1,000 per year. We use this definition in a broad sense, 
considering that some countries with higher incomes per capita share many characteristics with typical 
LICs. Notably, we exclude India and China from our analysis. This is mostly because these countries 
present economic and institutional characteristics that are very different from the usual LICs. In addition, a 
vast and growing literature is devoted to these countries. 
5 By referring to monetary transmission in low-income countries as “weak” or “ineffective”, we mean that 
the effect of monetary policy on aggregate demand is small; and by “unreliable”, we mean that the effect   3
 
The paper is structured as follows. The next section provides an overview of the 
monetary transmission mechanism in advanced countries as conventionally understood, 
with the goal of highlighting the assumptions about the economy’s financial structure that 
underpin the various channels of monetary transmission typically identified for such 
countries.  Section III examines the extent to which the stylized facts about financial 
structure in low income countries match the assumptions identified in Section II.  
Differences in financial structure suggest that the bank lending channel is likely to be the 
dominant channel for monetary transmission in LICs.  Accordingly, Section IV develops 
a small model of commercial bank behavior to explore the factors that are likely to 
determine the effectiveness of this channel.   Section V examines some cross-country 
evidence on this issue, comparing transmission from central bank policy rates to bank 
lending rates in LICs, advanced, and emerging economies.  Section VI provides a 
selective critical review of the systematic country-specific evidence on the effectiveness 
of monetary transmission in LICs.
6 The final section provides a summary.  
 
II. Monetary transmission in advanced economies 
 
  The standard description of the monetary transmission mechanism in advanced 
economies proceeds as follows: 
 
1. The formulation of monetary policy 
 
  Monetary policy is assumed to be formulated by an independent or quasi-
independent central bank in pursuit of broad macroeconomic objectives, rather than with 
the objective of meeting the government’s financing needs.  In the United States, for 
example, this situation dates to the Fed-Treasury Accord of 1951, which freed the Fed to 
pursue its own macroeconomic objectives, rather than simply pegging the interest rate on 
Treasury bills for fiscal reasons.
7   
 
2. The policy instrument  
Although the Finance Ministry is assumed to hold periodic auctions of 
government securities to finance deficits and refinance maturing debt (the primary 
market for government securities), these are assumed to be purchased by the domestic or 
foreign private sectors or by foreign official institutions, rather than by the domestic 
                                                                                                                                                 
depends on country-specific structural and institutional features and is likely to vary over time in 
unpredictable ways, and also depends.  
6 A companion appendix not included with this draft reports the conclusions of a more extensive list of 
previous studies on monetary transmission in individual low-income countries.  
 
7 The role of central bank independence in monetary transmission (as opposed to monetary policy 
formulation) is discussed later in this section (see footnote 10). 
   4
central bank.  The central bank conducts monetary policy by buying and selling short-
term government securities in a well-functioning secondary market.  In doing so, its 
objective is to control the value of some financial market variable (e.g., the interbank 
interest rate, the stock of unborrowed reserves, the monetary base, or the money stock) as 
an intermediate target.  In recent years, central banks in advanced and emerging 
economies have most commonly targeted an interbank rate (e.g., the federal funds rate in 
the United States).  The value of this intermediate target is assumed to influence 
aggregate demand through the transmission mechanism and thus to affect the central 
bank’s ultimate macroeconomic objective(s) (typically, price stability and/or full 
employment).  The intermediate target is accordingly typically set through a feedback 
rule that depends on the observed values of the ultimate macroeconomic objective(s). 
 
3. The transmission mechanism  
The transmission mechanism from open market transactions by the central bank 
to aggregate demand can be described as follows (consider for concreteness the example 
of a central bank purchase of government securities): 
 
  From central bank intervention in the market for short-term government securities 
to interest rates in the interbank market for reserves. 
 
The sellers of short-term government securities to the central bank hold the 
proceeds in commercial banks (these sellers are often the commercial banks themselves), 
thereby increasing commercial banks’ free reserves.  The increased stock of reserves 
causes a reduction in the interbank rate. 
 
  From interest rates in the interbank market to interest rates on short-term 
government securities. 
 
Arbitrage in commercial bank portfolios between the interbank market and bank 
holdings of very short-term government securities creates an equilibrium relationship 
between the return on those securities and the interbank rate.  When the interbank rate is 
low relative to the prevailing rate on short-term government securities, banks reallocate 
their asset portfolios away from reserves, which can be used for lending in the interbank 
market, and into purchasing short-term Treasury bills, which lowers the rate of return on 
those bills (and vice versa when the interbank rate is high). The arbitrage condition 
between the return on short-term government securities and the interbank rate leads to the 
following relationship: 
 
                                              iT = iR,                                                                      (1) 
 
where iT is the interest rate on very short-term government securities and iR is the 
interbank rate.  Notice that this arbitrage condition describes the relationship between the 
two interest rates, but does not pin down the value of either rate. 
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To see how the central bank can set iR, note that banks purchase short-term 
Treasury bills by issuing deposits on themselves, but for financial market equilibrium to 
hold, these new deposits must be willingly held by the nonbank public. For this to be the 
case, the rate of return on alternative assets has to fall.  These alternative assets are 
precisely short-term Treasury bills.  Write the demand for deposits as D(iT, Y), where Y 
denotes real income and D1 < 0, D2 > 0.  Let rr be the required reserve ratio, er the ratio 
of excess reserves to deposits (taken to be a decreasing function of the differential 
between the Treasury bill rate iT and the return on reserves iR, with er equal to some 
equilibrium value er*  when that differential is zero), equilibrium in the market for 
reserves requires: 
  
                                          H = [rr + er(iT – iR)]D(iT, Y),                                               (2) 
 
where H is the supply of reserves.  Using (1), this becomes: 
 
                                                       H = (rr + er*)D(iB, Y) 
 
To hit a desired target for the money market rate, say i*R, the central bank therefore has 
to set:   
 
                                                      H* = (rr + er*)Pd(i*R, Y) 
 
This “liquidity effect” creates the first channel through which monetary policy 
may affect aggregate demand. Under sticky prices and rational expectations, the short-run 
expected rate of inflation is unaffected by the central bank’s intervention in the Treasury 
bill market, so the effects of open-market operations on the interest rate on short-term 
Treasury bills should be reflected in the short-term real interest rate, which (at least 
potentially) affects aggregate demand directly by altering the intertemporal profile of 
household consumption (in formal terms through the Euler equation).  The effectiveness 
of this channel, which is one component of the interest rate channel, depends on the 
degree of intertemporal substitutability in consumption as well as on the extent to which 
households are rationed in credit markets.  The higher the degree of intertemporal 
substitution in consumption and the less prevalent is credit rationing the more effective 
this channel is likely to be.  As we shall discuss below, there is a separate component of 
the interest rate channel which affects spending on durable goods by households and 
firms.  Accordingly, to be precise, we can refer to this first channel as the short-term 
interest rate channel.  
 
  From the interbank rate to bank lending rates. 
 
  In principle, an increase in the size of banks’ deposit base should increase the 
volume of resources that banks intermediate (but see below), thus increasing banks’ 
supply of loanable funds.  Competition among banks would be expected to cause this 
increased supply of funds to reduce bank lending rates as well as to increase the 
availability of credit for rationed borrowers, if any.  This induces a second effect on 
aggregate demand, as the reduced interest rates on bank loans and greater availability of   6
bank credit induces an increase in spending by bank-dependent agents (typically small, 
opaque firms).  This second channel of monetary transmission is referred to as the bank 
lending channel, one component of a broader credit channel. The effectiveness of this 
channel depends on the extent that an expansion of reserves does increase the supply of 
bank loans, and that an increase in the supply of bank loans reduces the cost of finance 
for the nonbank sector. 
 
  Why might the supply of bank loans not be affected?  There are two reasons.  
First, on the liability side of banks’ balance sheets, banks may be able to attract resources 
not just by issuing deposits, but also by issuing their own short-term securities (e.g., 
negotiable CDs in the United States).  Thus, when their supply of deposits increases, they 
may simply cut back on the securities they issue, leaving the asset side of their balance 
sheets unchanged.  This happens when short-term securities and deposits are close 
substitutes.
8  Second, on the asset side of banks’ balance sheets, when their deposit base 
increases, banks may simply purchase more securities, rather than make more loans.  This 
would be more likely to happen when securities and loans are close substitutes (in the 
portfolios both of banks and their customers) – in other words, when bank lending is not 
“special” in the usual sense.
9  The strength of that channel depends on the degree of 
competition among banks (which determines the response of banks’ lending rate to 
banks’ cost of funds).   In a non-competitive environment (because of regulation or 
collusion), banks will not pass on their reduced costs of funding to their loan rates.   
 
  From short-term government securities to the exchange rate. 
 
  Whatever the strength of the bank lending channel, up to this point the expansion 
of bank reserves has been associated with a reduction in short-term interest rates. At this 
point various other types of arbitrage kick in.   
 
Under floating exchange rates and perfect capital mobility, arbitrage between 
domestic and foreign short-term government securities causes incipient capital flows 
which change the equilibrium value of the exchange rate required to sustain uncovered 
interest parity.  This triggers a third channel of transmission, the exchange rate channel.  
With sticky prices, this change in the nominal exchange rate is reflected in a real 
exchange rate depreciation that induces expenditure switching between domestic and 
foreign goods.  The effectiveness of this channel depends on the central bank’s 
willingness to allow the exchange rate to move (which may be constrained by “fear of 
floating”), on the degree of capital mobility (for a given change in domestic short-term 
interest rates, there will be less movement in the exchange rate the lower the degree of 
capital mobility), on the strength of expenditure-switching effects (this depends on the 
commodity composition of production and consumption), on the importance of currency 
mismatches (because adverse balance sheet effects could create negative expenditure-
                                                 
8 Notice that this implies a very high elasticity of demand for money – i.e., a very flat LM curve. 
9 Not everyone agrees that the role of securities and large CDs necessarily weakens the credit channel in 
advanced economies.  For a contrary view, see Keeton (1993).   7
reduction effects that may offset or even dominate expenditure-switching effects), and on 
the degree of exchange rate pass-through (because what induces expenditure switching is 
a change in the real exchange rate, which is less likely to follow from a change in the 
nominal exchange rate when pass-through is large).   
 
  From interest rates on short-term government securities to interest rates on long-
term government securities. 
 
An expectation mechanism operating on the term structure ties interest rates on 
short-term securities to rates on longer-term securities.  The effectiveness of this 
mechanism depends, among other things, on the perceived permanence of the change in 
short-term rates – i.e., on the information content of a change in the current short-term 
rate for expected future short-term rates.  Changes in long-term interest rates in turn give 
rise to two additional channels.  The long-term interest rate channel operates through the 
effects of changes in long-term interest rates on firms’ and households’ purchases of 
durable goods. While the short-term interest rate affects mostly household consumption, 
the long-term real interest rate affects firms’ spending on investment through the cost of 
capital and household spending on durables.
10   
 
  From long-term interest rates to asset values. 
 
  Changes in long-term interest rates affect the discount factors applied to future 
income streams, including those from long-maturity bonds, equities and real assets.  The 
asset channel operates through the implications of changes in long-term interest rates for 
the prices of such assets, which exert wealth effects on private consumption.  The 
effectiveness of this channel depends on the sensitivity of asset values to changes in long-
term rates, on the ratio of these components of wealth to household incomes, and possibly 
on the distribution of these assets among households if the marginal propensity to 
consume varies across households.  
 
  From asset values to external finance premia 
 
Changes in asset values affect the collateralizable net worth of firms and households.  
Because the availability of collateral reduces the severity of the moral hazard problem 
that is associated with external finance for firms and households, it reduces the premium 
that lenders charge such borrowers over the risk-free interest rate, known as the external 
finance premium.   Fluctuations in asset values are therefore negatively correlated with 
fluctuations in the external finance premium.  This creates a mechanism that reinforces 
                                                 
10 Why does central bank independence matter from the perspective of monetary transmission as opposed 
to that of policy formulation?  The answer is that, as suggested in the previous paragraph, the transmission 
from short-term interest rates to longer-term rates depends on agents’ interpretation of what an 
unanticipated change in monetary policy indicates about future monetary policy.  This in turn depends on 
their understanding of the central bank’s policy reaction function.  Because the degree of central bank 
independence affects the nature of the central bank’s policy reaction function, it may thus be expected to 
also affect agents’ interpretation of the implications of current monetary policy actions for expected future 
monetary policy. 
   8
the effects of changes in interest rates on the cost of external financing: higher interest 
rates reduce asset values and therefore increase the external finance premium.  This 
financial accelerator is a manifestation of a distinct channel for monetary transmission, 
the balance sheet channel. 
 
4. Underlying assumptions 
Note that this conventional description of monetary transmission relies on 
effective arbitrage along several margins: between different domestic short-term 
securities, between domestic short-term and long-term securities, between long-term 
securities and equities, between domestic and foreign securities, and between domestic 
financial and real assets.  It is therefore clearly intended to apply to an economy with a 
highly developed and competitive financial system.  As such, it implicitly assumes the 
following institutional setup, which is typically taken for granted in discussions of 
monetary transmission in OECD countries: 
 
  A strong institutional environment so that loan contracts are protected, and 
financial intermediation is conducted through formal financial markets. 
  An independent central bank. 
  A well-functioning and highly liquid interbank market for reserves. 
  A well-functioning and highly liquid secondary market for government securities.  
  Well-functioning and highly liquid markets for equities and real estate. 
  A high degree of international capital mobility. 
  A floating exchange rate. 
 
As we shall argue below, these conditions are rarely satisfied in low-income countries, 
which raises doubts about the relevance of the standard description of monetary 
transmission for such countries.  The question is how far off the mark the standard 
description of monetary transmission is in a “typical” LIC. 
 
III. The monetary policy environment in LICs 
 
  To the extent that financial structures in LICs depart from the assumptions listed 
at the end of the last section, we should expect the transmission mechanism in those 
economies to differ from the standard description.  In this section we will examine the 
extent to which the conditions listed at the end of the previous section are satisfied in 
LICs, before turning in the sections that follow to empirical evidence on mechanisms of 
monetary transmission in LICs. 
 
1. Size of the formal financial sector 
 
  Financial intermediation may be carried out either inside or outside the formal 
financial sector.  Informal finance may involve transactions between related parties, 
reliance on specialized moneylenders, or the use of informal credit cooperatives.   All of 
these have in common that they rely on informal means to overcome asymmetric   9
information and contract enforcement problems, and they are likely to play a dominant 
role in financial intermediation when the formal institutional environment is weak.   
Under these circumstances the formal financial sector is likely to be small and to conduct 
a relatively minor fraction of financial intermediation. 
 
  Panel A of Table 1 suggests that this is indeed the case in low-income countries.  
Relative to advanced and emerging economies, LICs exhibit substantially smaller ratios 
of deposit money bank assets to GDP as well as of nonbank financial intermediary assets 
to GDP.
11  The ratio to GDP of assets held by deposit money banks and other formal 
financial institutions in advanced countries is 1.24, while in LICs it is only 0.32.  Thus, 
relative to what is typically the case in advanced countries, the formal financial sector is a 
relatively much smaller player in LICs. 
 
  How should this be expected to affect monetary transmission?  The transmission 
mechanism can be decomposed into two steps: from central bank actions to financial 
variables such as those described in the last section, and from financial variables to 
aggregate demand.  When the formal financial sector is small, much of the economy does 
not interact with the formal financial sector.  Consequently, any effects of monetary 
policy on formal financial sector variables (e.g., on bank loan rates) would tend to have 
weaker effects on aggregate demand than would be true where formal financial 
intermediation is extensive.  In other words, the second step in the transmission 
mechanism, which depends on the elasticity of the IS curve with respect to formal-sector 
financial variables, would tend to be weak when the formal financial sector is small.  As 
indicated in Section VI, the existing evidence suggests that this is indeed frequently true 
in low-income countries. 
 
2. Central bank independence 
 
  Arnone, Laurens and Segalotto (2006) constructed a measure of central bank 
independence for a group of 145 advanced, emerging, and low-income economies.  Panel 
B of Table 1 provides a comparison of this measure for groups of countries classified into 
each of these categories.  The key observation is that central banks in both emerging and 
low-income countries appear to be significantly less independent than those in advanced 
economies, with LIC central banks being roughly half as independent as those in 
emerging economies.  As indicated before, this affects not just the scope for the exercise 
of monetary policy, but also the effects of that policy, because it influences the perceived 
implications of any current monetary policy action for future monetary policy. 
 
                                                 





Groups Other financial 
institutions 












Rule of Law Control of 
Corruption
Advanced
Mean 0.55  0.96 1.08 0.92 1.44 1.34  1.47 1.54
# countries  52 8   29   29   29   29    29   29
Emerging
Mean 0.17  0.60 -0.03 -0.35 0.40 0.37  0.09 0.07
# countries  11  26   28   28   28   28    28   28
LIC
Mean 0.06  0.33 -0.34 -0.30 -0.52 -0.45 -0.51 -0.49
# countries  18  91   118   118   118    118    118   118
Total
Mean 0.17  0.50 -0.06 -0.10 -0.05 -0.02 -0.09 -0.06
















Mean 0.73  0.51  0.46  1.00 0.02 0.67 1.00 
# countries  29  22  22  21 28 28 21 
Emerging
Mean 0.58  0.12  0.29  0.86 0.05 0.57 0.87 
# countries  27  24  24  28 28 28 28 
LIC
Mean 0.55  0.00  0.43  0.56 0.06 0.73 0.89 
# countries  89  33 4 2 85 87 42 
Total
Mean 0.59  0.28  0.38  0.75 0.05 0.69 0.91 
# countries  145  49  49  91 141 143 91  91
E. Bank competition
F. Degree of financial 
repression

















Table 1. Financial Environment Across Countries, 2005
A. Size of banking sector  C. Governance Indicators 2008 
Deposit money bank assets / 
gdp 
1.24   11
 
Notes:  
Securities market index relates to securities markets and covers policies to develop domestic bond and equity markets, including (i) the 
creation of basic frameworks such as the auctioning of T-bills, or the establishment of a security commission; (ii) policies to further 
establish securities markets such as tax exemptions, introduction of medium- and long-term government bonds to establish a 
benchmark for the yield curve, or the introduction of a primary dealer system; (iii) policies to develop derivative markets or to create 
an institutional investor’s base; and (iv) policies to permit access to the domestic stock market by nonresidents. Entry barriers/pro-
competition measures index measures competition restrictions, such as limits on branches and entry barriers in the banking sector, 
including licensing requirements or limits on foreign banks. Interest rate controls index covers interest rate controls, such as floors or 
ceilings.   
Sources: International Financial Statistics (IFS) of IMF; Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (2009), "A New Database on Financial 
Development and Structure"; IMF Structural reform  (SR) database "Structural Reforms and Economic Performance in Advanced and 
Developing Countries"  (2008), prepared by the Research Department of IMF;  Dhungana, Sandesh (2008), “Capital Account 
Liberalization and Growth Volatility,” Williams College, unpublished. Governance Indicators (2008), are taken from Daniel Kaufman, 
Aart Kraay and Massimo Mastruzzi (2009). “Governance Matters VIII: Governance Indicators for 1996-2008” World Bank Policy 
Research June 2009. The index of Central Bank Independence and the first securities market index are taken from Arnone, Laurens 
and Segalotto (2006).  
 
Groups Stock market total
value traded / gdp
Advanced
Mean 0.79 
# countries 29 
Emerging
Mean 0.53 
# countries 28 
LIC
Mean 0.02 
# countries 52 
Total
Mean 0.35 
# countries 109 
Groups 1  2  3  4 1 2 3  4  6
Advanced
# countries 19  0 0  10 19 0 7  3  0
% countries 22  0 0  34 29 0 23  38 0
Emerging
# countries 7  0 11  95 9 10  2  1
% countries 8  0 20  31 81 7 3 3   25 50
LIC
# countries 60  4 44  10 41 45 13  3  1
% countries 70  100  80  34 63 83 43  38 50
Total
# countries 86  4 55  29 65 54 30  8  2
% countries 100  100  100  100 100 100 100  100 100
Table 1. Financial Environment Across Countries, 2005 (continued …)
     Stock market 
capitalization / gdp
No. Of listed companies per 10k 
population








I. Exchange Rate Classification (IMF) J. Exchange rate classification (Ilzetzki, Reinhart and Rogoff)

























3. Quality of the institutional and regulatory environment 
 
  The small size of the formal financial sector in many LICs is undoubtedly due in 
large part to the serious deficiencies in the institutional and regulatory environment that 
characterizes many of these countries.  As indicated in Panel C of Table 1, LICs score 
substantially lower than both advanced and emerging economies on the full range of the 
Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2009) governance indicators.   This poor institutional 
environment affects not just the overall size of the formal financial sector, but also the 
environment in which that sector operates.  Political instability, poor accounting and 
disclosure standards, weak property rights, limited government accountability, a weak 
regulatory environment, a poorly functioning legal system, and the prevalence of 
corruption would all tend to contribute to high costs of financial intermediation. 
 
 
 4. Money and interbank market development 
 
While we know of no comprehensive dataset on this issue, substantial case study 
evidence suggests that money and interbank markets are poorly developed or nonexistent 
in many LICs (see IMF 2005). The poor institutional environment provides a plausible 
reason.  In the absence of an institutional infrastructure that promotes bank transparency, 
with a weak regulatory and supervisory structure, and with the occasional inability to 
enforce contracts, mutual distrust causes banks to avoid lending to each other.   
Moreover, these same institutional deficiencies also make lending to the nonbank sector 
an expensive proposition, which means that unlike banks in advanced countries, which 
sometimes demand or supply excess reserves, banks in many LICs have chronic excess 
reserves. With all potential participants on one side of the market, there is no demand for 
interbank transactions.  
 
5. Secondary market for government securities.   
 
     The secondary markets for government securities tend to be poorly developed in 
LICs.  Panel D in Table 1 provides some evidence for this observation.  For example, the 
average of the index of securities market development presented in the last column 
attains only half of its average advanced country value in LICs.
 12 The implication of poor 
securities market development is that central banks cannot conduct monetary policy 
through open market transactions in liquid secondary markets.  Instead, monetary policy 
instruments tend to consist of purchases of Treasury bills in primary auctions (which 
                                                 
12 The index is drawn from the IMF structural reform database. It relates to securities markets and covers 
policies to develop domestic bond and equity markets, including (i) the creation of basic frameworks such 
as the auctioning of T-bills, or the establishment of a security commission; (ii) policies to further establish 
securities markets such as tax exemptions, introduction of medium- and long-term government bonds to 
establish a benchmark for the yield curve, or the introduction of a primary dealer system; (iii) policies to 
develop derivative markets or to create an institutional investor’s base; and (iv) policies to permit access to 
the domestic stock market by nonresidents.    13
effectively gives the central bank control over the share of new Treasury issues that must 
be held by the public) and of the amounts and terms of credit extended by the central 
bank to the commercial banking system (rediscounts).
13 
 
6. Competition in the banking sector 
 
  Banking sectors in LICs tend to be only imperfectly competitive, partly because 
the banking industry is characterized by a small number of banks and by an important 
role for government-owned banks, but also because the industry faces weak competition 
from nonbank financial intermediaries.  As shown in Panel E of Table 1, banking sectors 
in LICs on average exhibit both larger net interest margins as well as higher degrees of 
concentration than those in advanced and emerging economies.  As shown in Panel A, the 
size of the nonbank financial sector is very small compared to those in advanced and 
emerging economies not only in absolute terms, but also relative to the size of the 
banking sector.   
 
     The relevance of this observation for monetary transmission concerns the 
connection between policy rates and market rates: when the banking system is 
imperfectly competitive, changes in policy interest rates (e.g., the central bank’s 
rediscount rate) may have weak effects on market rates, since imperfectly competitive 
banks may not pass on changes in policy rates.  If so, changes in policy rates may largely 
affect banking spreads, rather than market rates. 
  
7.  Financial repression 
 
     The flexibility of market rates may also be reduced by legal restrictions on the 
interest rates that banks can apply both to their liabilities as well as to their assets.  As 
shown in Panel F of Table 1, financial liberalization has been undertaken widely in LICs
 
14.However, this process is not complete.  Restrictions on the role of the market in setting 
bank loan rates remain notably more important in LICs on average than in advanced or 
emerging economies. 
  
 8.  Maturity of government obligations 
 
                                                 
13 In contrast to advanced economies, discount credit is used very commonly as a monetary policy 
instrument in LICs. As a rough indicator, approximately three-quarters of our LIC sample of 109 countries 
report at least 5 years of monthly data on discount rates, and there is significant variation in discount rates 
over time. A simple variance decomposition exercise suggests that 95 percent of the variation in discount 
rates in our sample is within countries (as opposed to across countries).  Buzeneca and Maino (2007) report 
that, while no advanced countries in the IMF’s Information Systems for Instruments of Monetary Policy 
(ISIMP) database  used discount credit as a monetary policy instrument, 69 percent of low-income 
countries did so. 
14 Financial repression is measured by controls on interest rate including whether the government directly 
controls interest rates or whether floors, ceilings or interest rate bands exist. The index is taken from the 
IMF structural reform database and is normalized between zero and one, with higher values indicating less 
financial repression and higher degrees of liberalization.    14
     As documented in the “original sin” literature (see Eichengreen and Hausmann 
1999), governments in LICs are typically unable to issue long-term domestic currency-
denominated bonds.  The absence of long-term government bonds means that there is no 
observable market-based term structure.  This implies more uncertainty about future 
short-term interest rates than would be the case with a well-developed term structure, 
since in the absence of long-term securities agents are unable to contract in the present 
for the interest rate that will prevail over the life of an asset and are forced to finance such 
assets by rolling over short-term loans at whatever interest rate prevails at the time.   
 
  In principle, the effects of the absence of long-term securities on monetary 
transmission are ambiguous.  On the one hand, because the average maturity of financial 
contracts is shorter, it means that monetary policy can have a more significant short-run 
impact on the cash-flow positions of firms and households.  On the other, because long-
maturity assets are scarce, wealth effects operating through changes in the value of such 
assets are likely to be weaker (Kamin et al 1998). 
 
9. Stock market size and liquidity 
 
     Many low-income countries are characterized by the complete absence of a 
domestic stock market, or where such a market is present, by a small number of listed 
firms and minimal turnover in the market.  Panel G of Table 1 indicates that stock market 
capitalization relative to GDP is significantly smaller in low-income countries than in 
either advanced or emerging economies, and both the ratio of value traded to GDP and 
the turnover ratio in the market are dramatically smaller in low-income countries than in 
the others. 
   
The implication is that the value of physical capital in place is not easily marked to 
market in low-income countries, and the illiquidity of physical capital may short-circuit 
the asset channel working through equity prices.   
 
10.  Efficiency of real estate markets 
 
Data on the functioning of real estate markets in LICs is notoriously difficult to 
obtain.  Nevertheless, there is substantial indirect evidence that such markets are poorly 
developed and highly illiquid.  Many low-income countries are characterized by poorly-
defined property rights, which inhibits the buying and selling of real estate.  While 
property rights have many dimensions, at bottom they require a low risk of predation, 
either by the government or by other private agents.  A poor institutional environment is 
likely to be associated with a high risk of predation, and thus with de facto weak property 
rights.  As panel C in Table 1 indicates, in this respect LICs are far worse than advanced 
economies.  The implication is that, like the market for shares in productive firms, the 
real estate market is also likely to be highly illiquid and market prices for real estate 
poorly defined.  Again, the implication for monetary policy is that a potentially important 
channel for arbitrage is weakened, diminishing the power of the asset channel. 
 
11. International financial integration   15
 
Panel H of Table 1 reports the ratio of the sum of gross external assets and 
liabilities (net of foreign exchange reserves on the asset side and of official borrowing on 
the liability side) to GDP, an indicator of de facto international financial integration.  This 
indicator provides evidence that low-income countries are characterized by a significantly 
smaller degree of de facto integration with international capital markets than are 
advanced countries, and by a smaller degree of integration than emerging economies as 
well.  This affects another important arbitrage margin: that between domestic and foreign 
financial assets.  The implications of imperfect capital mobility for monetary 
transmission depend on the exchange rate regime.  Under fixed exchange rates, the 
weakening of this arbitrage margin allows at least some degree of monetary autonomy, 
and thus allows the functioning of an interest rate channel.  Under floating rates, it 
implies a smaller change in the exchange rate for a given change in the domestic interest 
rate, and thus weakens the exchange rate channel. 
 
12.  Exchange rate flexibility 
 
The very presence of an exchange rate channel depends on the exchange rate 
regime adopted by the country.  Here again, low-income countries tend to differ from 
advanced and emerging economies.  As indicated in Table 1, whether classified by their 
official (de jure) announced regimes Panel I), or by de facto exchange rate behavior 
(Panel J), low-income countries tend to restrict exchange rate flexibility to a much greater 
extent than do either advanced or emerging economies.  This reduced exchange rate 





  The evidence presented above has important implications for the channels of 
monetary transmission in a “typical” low-income country.  Specifically, the poor 
development of domestic securities markets suggests that both the short-run and long-run 
interest rate channels should be weak, while small and illiquid markets for assets such as 
equities and real estate would tend to weaken the asset channel.  The exchange rate 
channel is weak in countries that maintain relatively fixed exchange rates, but may play a 
role in monetary transmission in LICs with more flexible exchange rates.  In general, 
therefore, we should expect monetary transmission to occur primarily through the effects 
of central bank actions on the short-term interest rates charged by banks on loans and 
(possibly) paid by them on deposits – i.e., the banking lending channel should be the 
dominant mode of monetary transmission in low-income countries.   
 
IV. Effectiveness of the bank lending channel in low-
income countries  
 
The previous section suggested some strong a priori reasons to believe that the 
monetary transmission mechanism in LICs should differ substantially from that in   16
advanced countries. In particular, the bank lending channel is likely to be the dominant 
channel for monetary transmission in LICs.  If so, the effectiveness and reliability of 
monetary transmission in these countries depends on the properties of this specific 
channel.  The relevant properties concern two links in the causal chain from monetary 
policy actions to aggregate demand: that between monetary policy actions and the 
availability and cost of bank credit, and that between the availability and cost of bank 
credit and aggregate demand.  The previous section has already suggested that when the 
formal financial sector is small, the second of these links is likely to be weak.  This 
section explores the factors that are likely to determine the effectiveness of the first link. 
 
The literature suggests that the effectiveness and reliability of the link between 




  If the banking industry is noncompetitive, changes in banks’ costs of funds may 
be reflected in bank profit margins, rather than in the supply of bank lending. 
 
  If a poor institutional environment increases the cost of bank lending, banks may 
restrict lending activity, in a manner that weakens the effects of monetary policy 
actions on the supply of loans. 
 
This section develops a simple model of bank lending behavior that explores the possible 
roles of both of these factors, before turning to the empirical evidence in the sections that 
follow. 
 
  Consider a representative LIC commercial bank that manages a portfolio 
consisting of loans (L), government securities (B), as well as reserves (R), and finances it 
by issuing deposits (D) and obtaining central bank credit (C).  The bank’s demand for 
central bank credit is therefore given by: 
 
                                                       C = L + B + R – D                                                     (3) 
 
To capture the role of imperfect competition in the banking sector, assume that the bank 
has market power in both the loan and deposit markets, so it faces a demand for loans 
given by:  
 
                                                       L = L(iL), L’ < 0,                                                    (4a)   
 
and a supply of deposits: 
 
                                                       D = D(iD), D’ > 0,                                                    (4b) 
 
                                                 
15 See, for example, Cottarelli and Kourelis (1994), as well as Kwapil and Scharlet (2006).   17
where iL and iD are respectively the loan and deposit rates set by the bank.  The bank has 
no market power, however, in the market for government securities, where it faces the 
market interest rate iB.   Credit market frictions (asymmetric information and costly 
contract enforcement) make lending a costly activity and justify the existence of banks.  
To capture this phenomenon, costs of intermediation are taken to be an increasing and 
convex function of the volume of loans intermediated: 
 
                                                      c = c(L), with c’ > 0, c’’ >0                                       (5) 
 
The more unfavorable the domestic institutional environment is for financial 
intermediation, the more rapidly these costs increase with the volume of funds being 
intermediated – i.e., when the institutional environment is very unfavorable, as in the case 
of LICs, we should expect c’’ >> 0. The idea is that lending becomes more costly as 
banks expand beyond their traditional customers that they know well. This effect is 
stronger in countries with weak institutional settings.
16 
 
The “lemons” problem associated with asymmetric information about loan quality 
makes bank loans illiquid, and the absence of a secondary market for government 
securities makes those instruments illiquid as well.  The bank therefore values reserves 
because they provide the only available liquid buffer against unanticipated deposit 
withdrawals (for simplicity, we assume that there are no required reserves).  This 
“liquidity premium,” which we denote ρ, is a decreasing and convex function of the ratio 
of reserves to deposits, i.e.: 
 
                                                ρ = ρ(R/D), with ρ’ < 0 and ρ’’ > 0.                                 (6) 
 
The central bank charges the interest rate iC for credit extended to commercial banks, but 
rations this credit among individual commercial banks, so that our bank faces the 
constraint: 
 
                                                      C ≤  Cbar,                                                                      (7) 
 
with Cbar denoting the maximum amount of central bank credit available to this bank. 
 
  Under these conditions, the bank’s problem is to set its lending and deposit rates, 
and to choose its holdings of government securities and reserves, so as to maximize 
profits, subject to its balance sheet constraint (3) and the supply of central bank credit (7).  
In other words, its problem is to: 
 
             Max π (iL, iD, B, R) = iLL(iL) + iBB + ρ(R/D)R – c(L) – iDD(iD) – iC C 
 
subject to (3) and (7), as well as to nonnegativity constraints on its balance sheet 
variables. We will assume that the nonnegativity constraints are not binding, but that the 
                                                 
16 This assumption is widely confirmed by the country evidence reported in Section VI.   18
central bank’s credit constraint (7) is.  Under these assumptions, the first-order conditions 
are given by: 
 
                                             L + iL L’ – c’- iC L’ – λL’ = 0                                             (8a) 
 
                                   - ρ’(R/D)
2D’  -D - iD D’ + iC D’ + λD’ = 0                                  (8b) 
 
                                                       iB - iC  – λ = 0                                                            (8c) 
 
                                                - ρ’(R/D) -  iC  - λ = 0                                                      (8d) 
 
  Notice from (8c) that for the central bank credit constraint to be binding (i.e., for λ 
> 0), we must have iB > iC .  The intuition is straightforward: as long as the return on 
government securities exceeds the interest rate on bank credit, the bank would always 
prefer to borrow additional amounts from the central bank in order to purchase more 
government securities.  We are assuming that this is the case.   Notice also from (8c) that 
iC  + λ =  iB.  Substituting this expression in (8d) yields the bank’s demand for reserves as 
a function of its deposit base and the interest rate on government securities: 
 
                                          R = h(iB)D, where h’  = - 1/ρ’’ < 0.                                        (9) 
 
From (8a) and (8c) we can express the optimal lending rate as: 
 
                                                 iL = (1 + 1/ξL) (iB + c’(L) ),                                            (10) 
 
where ξL is the elasticity of loan demand.  This equation expresses the loan interest rate as 
a markup (1 + 1/ξL) over the marginal cost of loanable funds, where the latter is given by 
the foregone return on government securities plus marginal intermediation costs.  This 
markup is larger the less competitive the banking environment – i.e., the less elastic the 
demand for loans facing an individual bank.    Finally, using (8c), (8d) and (9) in (8b), the 
deposit rate is given by: 
 
                                                 iD = (1 + 1/ξL)
-1 iB (1 + h ).                                            (11) 
 
  Our primary concern is with the “pass-through” from the interest rate on 
government securities, which is the policy rate determined by the central bank, and 
commercial banks’ lending rates.
17  Assuming a constant loan demand elasticity, equation 
(10) and the loan demand equation (4a) together determine the optimal lending rate and 
loan supply as a function of the interest rate on government securities and the elasticity of 




                                                 
17 Notice that iC does  not serve as the policy rate. This follows from the assumption that the central bank 
credit constraint is binding i.e. it does not extend unlimited amounts of credit at this rate.   19
                                          diL /diB =       (1 + 1/ξL)           > 0                                         (12) 
                                                           1 – c’’L’(1 + 1/ξL) 
 
The key point for our purposes is that this “pass-through” coefficient is a decreasing 
function of c’’, the slope of the marginal intermediation-cost curve.  What this means is 
that if a deficient institutional environment causes problems of asymmetric information 
and costly contract enforcement to generate a steeply rising cost of financial 
intermediation when banks try to expand their lending, banks are less likely to adjust 
their lending rates in response to changes in the central bank’s policy rate.  Moreover, 
since equations (4a) and (10) imply that the lending rate depends only on iB, any other 
central bank action, such as changes in the supply of credit to banks or in the discount 
rate, would also leave the lending rate unchanged so long as such actions do not change 
the policy rate iB.  Finally, it is easy to see that it is not just the strength of the pass-
through effect that is at issue here, but also its reliability, since any factor that 
unexpectedly alters the shape of commercial banks’ intermediation cost curve (including 
changes in the stability of the domestic macroeconomic environment, in the policy 
regime, or in the institutional framework governing financial intermediation) will also 
affect the extent of pass-through from policy to lending rates through c’’. 
 
 In short, the bank lending channel may be dominant in the LIC context, but the 
effectiveness and reliability of this channel are not guaranteed.  Its effectiveness depends 
on the extent to which central bank policy actions affect commercial bank lending rates, 
and its reliability on the extent to which factors that determine commercial banks’ 
intermediation costs prove to be stable.   Since such factors may include non-structural 
ones that are subject to frequent change in LICs, the upshot is that the transmission 
mechanism may prove both weak and unreliable in the LIC context.  We next turn to an 
examination of the evidence on this issue.   
 
V. Monetary transmission in low-income countries: 
cross-country evidence  
 
Section III suggested some a priori reasons to expect the functioning of the 
monetary transmission mechanism to be quite different in LICs from what we observe in 
industrial and emerging economies.  Specifically, in the context of the limited degree of 
financial development that characterizes many LICs, the strength and reliability of the 
monetary transmission mechanism depend critically on the effectiveness of the bank 
lending channel.   In turn, the previous section showed that the deficient institutional 
environment in which banks operate in LICs makes the functioning even of this channel 
potentially quite different from what is observed in advanced economies, implying that 
the strength and reliability of this channel cannot be taken for granted in LICs.  To get a 
sense of the empirical relevance of these issues, this section presents some cross-country 
evidence on the effectiveness of various steps in the bank lending channel in countries at 
different income levels.  Specifically, we examine broad cross-country differences in the 
links between central bank policy actions and bank lending rates by computing some   20
simple correlations among the relevant financial variables in advanced, emerging, and 
low-income economies. 
 
1. From policy rates to market rates 
 
The first step of the transmission mechanism relates changes in policy rates to 
changes in money market rates. Table 3 reports statistics on the relationship between 
discount rates (as a proxy for policy rates) and money market rates in advanced, 
emerging, and low income countries, where such rates are available. Since direct central 
bank lending to commercial banks is more often used as a policy instrument in LICs than 
in countries with more sophisticated financial systems, we would expect changes in 
discount rates to be more closely associated with changes in money market rates in LICs 
where such markets exist than in advanced and emerging economies..
18   
 
The second column of Table 2 reports the average contemporaneous correlations between 
changes in discount rates and changes in money market rates in all three types of 
economies. Despite the likelihood that the discount rate represents a better indicator of 
the monetary policy stance in the LIC context, this correlation actually turns out to be 
somewhat lower on average in low income countries than in advanced and emerging 
countries. Columns 3 and 4 report the average short and long term correlations between 
the policy rate and money market rates.
19 These correlations are calculated by estimating 
the equation  12 1 2 it i it i it i it i it i it it yy y x x x            (where y is change in the 
money market rate and x the change in the discount rate) for each country. The short term 
effect reported in column 3 is the average estimated γ; the long-term effect reported in 









  .  These results suggest that an increase 
in the policy rate by one percentage point is associated with a 0.81 percentage point 
increase in the money market rate in advanced countries within one month, but only with 
a 0.29 percentage point increase in LICs. In the long run, the increase in the policy rate is 
fully transmitted to an increase in the money market rate in advanced countries, but is 
only partially transmitted (0.40) in LICs. This suggests a much weaker link between the 
policy instrument and market rates in LICs, both in the short and in the long run.
20 
 
                                                 
18 However, consistent with our observation in Section II, such markets are not common in LICs.  Out of a 
total of 109 LICs in our sample, only 30 report data on both discount rates and money market rates.  Of the 
109 LICs in our sample, 83 report discount rates, but only 45 report money market rates.  Only countries 
with at least 60 observations are included in the sample. For simplicity we use the same specification for all 
countries. Similar results are obtained if we use different specifications, including different lag structure.   
19 It may be more appropriate to give this regression a causal interpretation in the LIC case than in the case 
of the other country groups, because of the aforementioned role of central bank lending to commercial 
banks as a policy instrument in LICs. 
20 These results are not driven by outliers. Taking the medians rather than the means of the various income 
groups gives qualitatively similar results.     21
 







R-squared Number  of 
countries 
Advanced 0.29  0.81  0.96  0.32  24 
Emerging 0.30  0.74  0.59  0.93  26 
LICs 0.23  0.29  0.4  0.31  30 
Note: the discount rate corresponds to IFS line 60 and the money market rate to IFS line 60b. The data are 
monthly from January 1960 to December 2008, where available. Only countries with at least 5 years of data  
(i.e. 60 or more observations) are included.  The second column reports the average of the 
contemporaneous correlations. The third column reports the average estimated γ. The fourth column 









   from the regression 
12 1 2 it i it i it i it i it i it it yy y x x x            where y is change in the money market rate and x 
the change in the discount rate. The second to last column reports the average R-squared for the previous 




2. From money market rates to bank lending rates 
 
The discussion of financial structure in LICs in Section III suggested that the bank 
lending channel may play a particularly prominent role in the LIC environment.  A 
necessary condition for this mechanism to be operative, however, is that the lending rate 
charged by banks is responsive to the money market rate, where that rate exists. 43 LICs 
report data on money market and bank lending rates. 
21 Table 3, which follows the same 
structure as Table 2, shows a strong contemporaneous correlation between money market 
rates and bank lending rates in advanced and emerging economies, but a much weaker 
correlation in low-income countries.  The short-term partial correlation between money 
market rates and lending rates is also significantly weaker among-low income countries 
than among either advanced or emerging economies (column 3), and while differences in 
long-term effects are not as pronounced, they remain weaker in low-income countries.  
Most importantly, note that changes in money-market rates explain a much smaller 
proportion of the variance in lending rates in low-income countries than in either 






                                                 
21 Almost all the LICs in our sample report at least 5 years of data on bank lending rates.   22







R-squared Number  of 
countries 
Advanced 0.34 0.2  0.36  0.41  24 
Emerging 0.35  0.37  0.58  0.65  27 
LICs  0.17  0.1  0.3 0.16 43 
Note: the lending rate corresponds to IFS line 60p and the money market rate to IFS line 60b. The data are 
monthly from January 1960 to December 2008, where available. Only countries with at least for 5 years 
(i.e. 60 or more observations) are included.  The second column reports the average of the 
contemporaneous correlations. The third column reports the average estimated α. The fourth column 









   from the regression 
12 1 2 it i it i it i it i it i it it yy y x x x            where y is change in the lending rate and x the 
change in the money market rate. The second to last column reports the average R-squared for the previous 
regression. The last column reports the number of countries for each category. 
 
 
We consider these findings to be important, since they suggest that the links 
between the policy instrument controlled by central banks and the mechanism for 
transmission to the economy’s IS curve that is likely to be most relevant in LICs may 
actually be relatively loose and unreliable.   
 
Possible explanations, as alluded to before, are institutional deficiencies that 
discourage bank lending activity and/or noncompetitive behavior by banks.  To explore 
these explanations, we first run panel regressions in which monthly changes in bank 
lending rates are regressed on changes in discount rates, a measure of bank concentration, 
and interaction terms between changes in discount rates and the index of  bank 
concentration. The first column of Table 4 shows that one percentage point increase in 
the discount rate is associated on average with a contemporaneous 0.31 increase in 
lending rate. The second column of the table shows that the pass-through from discount 
to lending rates indeed appears to be affected by the degree of bank concentration (this 
index is equal to one if the index of bank concentration is higher than the median and 0 
otherwise). However, this result is not robust to the introduction of an index of 
transparency (column 3), our proxy for institutional quality.
22 As shown in column (3), 
improved transparency increases the correlation of changes in policy rates with lending 
rates, suggesting that the institutional deficiencies that discourage bank lending may be 
more important than bank concentration in explaining the limited pass-through from 
policy rates to lending rates in LICs, as suggested by the model of the last section.  
However, the specification in column 4 shows that a dummy variable for low income 
countries interacted with changes in the policy rate is highly significant in explaining the 
(lack of) transmission of policy rate to lending rate in LICs, even after controlling for 
bank concentration and institutional variables. Thus, although bank concentration and 
                                                 
22 The index of transparency is from the World Bank.   23
transparency may be part of the story, other unidentified factors also play a key role in 
explaining the difference between LICs and other countries. 
 
 
Table 4. Transmission mechanisms and bank concentration 
Dependent variable: monthly changes in lending rate 
                 
  [1] [2] [3] [4]  [5]
After 2000
          
Change in discount rate  0.31*** 2.93*** 1.44 1.52  0.18**
[0.09] [0.39] [1.28] [1.29]  [0.09]
          
Concentration  * Change 
in discount  rate 
  -2.39*** -1.15 -1.21  0.04
[0.45] [1.52] [1.52]  [0.17]
          
Concentration    -0.25 -1.39 1.31  -0.33
[0.21] [1.21] [1.21]  [0.23]
          
Transparency * Change 
in discount  rate 
   0.64** 0.60*  0.15**
[0.31] [0.31]  [0.05]
          
LIC * Change in 
discount rate 
    -0.76***  -0.23***
[0.19]  [0.05]
          
Country fixed effects  X X X X  X
Number of observations  33,296 14,480 9,650 9,650  3,806
Number of countries  140 116 67 67  51
R squared  0.03 0.51 0.53 0.53  0.15
Note: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. Robust standard errors clustered by 
country in parentheses. The index of bank concentration is 1 if banks are highly concentrated. The index of 
transparency is from Transparency International. 
 
Finally, column (5) reports regression results using the same specification as in 
column (4) but restricting the sample to observations after 2000. This is done because in 
the past financial repression was especially pervasive in LICs, so that lending rates were 
often fixed administratively or were subject to strong administrative constraints. In recent 
years, especially in the last decade, financial liberalization has become more widespread. 
The results indeed confirm that, even in the absence of pervasive financial repression, 
transparency and the “LIC dummy” continue to play a relevant role in explaining the link 
between the discount and lending rates.   24
 
The cross-evidence presented above should be interpreted with caution, mainly 
owing to the poor quality of data for LICs. For example, in many LICs, there is no 
operational policy rate or a relevant money market rate. Nonetheless, the main message 
from the cross-country evidence is that there is indeed reason to question the 
effectiveness of transmission from central bank policy to commercial bank lending rates 
in LICs.  Coupled with the suspicion that the small size of the formal financial sector 
would imply a weak effect of bank lending rates on aggregate demand, there are even 
stronger reasons to question the effectiveness of the bank lending channel in LICs. 
 
VI. Monetary transmission in low-income countries: 
country-specific evidence  
 
The previous section presented some cross-country empirical evidence suggesting 
that the transmission channel that we would expect to be dominant in the LIC context – 
the bank lending channel – may indeed work rather imperfectly in such countries.  
However, such cross-country evidence is at best crude and impressionistic.  At present 
the literature lacks a cross-country or cross-regional study capable of producing general 
stylized facts about monetary transmission in LICs.  However, there is now a large 
number of studies that consider this issue more systematically from a country-specific 
perspective.   This section briefly surveys the results of these studies.
23  Not surprisingly, 
most of the literature on the effectiveness of monetary transmission in LICs focuses on 
the bank lending channel.  However, since the exchange rate channel may be operative in 
countries that allow some exchange rate flexibility, we also examine some evidence on 
the effectiveness of this channel in LICs. Because our survey is selective and because 
even among the included studies several need to be interpreted with caution, our review 
of the evidence is intended for illustrative purposes only – i.e., to provide a flavor of 
where the literature stands at the present time.
24 25 
 
1. The bank lending channel 
 
The last section raised doubts about the strength of links between central bank 
policy actions and bank lending rates in LICs.  Consistent with these doubts, evidence on 
                                                 
23 An appendix table provides a summary of the studies included in our survey, and a companion appendix 
(not included in the draft) provides a more comprehensive list of recent studies. 
24 Among other things, as we will discuss below, many of these studies rely on VARs estimated with short 
spans of data and employing dubious identification strategies.   
25 In ongoing work, Mishra, Montiel, Pedroni and Spilimbergo (2010) use panel VAR techniques allowing 
more rigorously for country-specific differences to analyze whether monetary transmission mechanisms 
differ systematically between advanced and low-income countries, and if so, what structural factors drive 
the difference.   
   25
the role of the bank lending channel in individual low-income countries is in fact rather 
mixed.  
 
The empirical methodology of choice for investigating monetary transmission in 
LICs has been the estimation of impulse response functions (IRFs) and variance 
decompositions based on VARs with a small number of macro variables.  Note that 
establishing the empirical importance of the bank lending channel requires two steps: 
from central bank policy actions to the bank lending rate (as considered above) and/or 
supply of credit, and from the latter to aggregate demand.  Unfortunately, much of the 
existing literature on LICs focuses on one step or the other.  Few papers consider both 
steps, though in some cases the issue investigated is the reduced-form effect of central 
bank policy variables on an indicator of aggregate demand (output or prices).  In a small 
number of cases, the role of specific channels of transmission is investigated by 
comparing IRFs in which all channels are operative to ones in which the channel in 
question is turned off by making the variable that captures that channel exogenous, 
following Ramey (1993). 
 
a. Sub-Saharan Africa 
 
Uanguta and Ikhide (2002) considered both steps in the transmission channel in a 
study for Namibia.  They used the “narrative approach” of Romer and Romer (1990) (see 
also De Fiore (1998) and Morsink and Bayoumi (1999)) to identify focal episodes of 
monetary tightening by the South African Reserve Bank (because Namibia maintains a 
currency board pegged to the South African rand) and performed a dynamic forecasting 
analysis to see how changes in the policy instrument -- the repo rate/bank rate -- 
translated into deviations of several key variables from their “normal” behavior after each 
tightening episode.  They found that interest rates indeed tended to be higher and private 
investment lower after tightening episodes, thereby supporting the effectiveness of both 
steps in the transmission channel for Namibia. In addition, they estimated a VAR with 
private investment, consumer prices, lending rates, the repo rate and the money supply. 
Structural innovations were identified using a Choleski decomposition based on the 
ordering just described, justified by assumptions regarding the speed with which each 
variable responds to shocks.  Their main finding was that changes in the South African 
Reserve Bank’s policy rate is transmitted to lending rates in Namibia, as well as to 
private investment.  Both approaches, therefore, supported the effectiveness of the bank 
lending channel in Namibia. 
 
However, others have argued that the importance of the bank lending channel 
elsewhere in Sub-Saharan Africa is limited by the small size of and imperfections in the 
financial sector. Sacerdoti (2005), for example, noted that banks in Africa tend to extend 
limited amounts of credit to the private sector, as the result of underdeveloped 
institutional means to cope with credit market frictions that increase the cost of financial 
intermediation.  Instead, these banks hold 30-50 percent of their deposits as reserves at 
the central bank and in the form of short-term foreign assets.  To the extent that credit 
market frictions make deposits at the central bank, government bonds and foreign 
securities much closer substitutes among themselves than these alternative assets are with   26
private sector credit, this situation would tend to weaken the transmission mechanism 
through the bank lending channel.
26   
 
This hypothesis is supported by several studies that examine the strength of links 
between policy rates and ultimate macro objectives in a variety of African countries.  
Saxegaard (2006), for example, estimated that excess reserves amounted to over 13 
percent of deposits on average in Sub-Saharan banking systems in 2004, reflecting banks’ 
unwillingness or inability to lend, and argued that the impact of monetary policy on bank 
credit is likely to be limited under such circumstances.  He tested this prediction by 
estimating four-variable (with output, inflation, exchange rate, and monetary policy as the 
endogenous variables) threshold structural VARs (TVARs) for the countries in the 
Central African Economic and Monetary Community (CEMAC), as well as for Nigeria 
and Uganda.  The threshold variable was the existence of excess reserves over an 
estimated desired level of precautionary reserves, and identification was achieved for the 
policy variables by assuming that non-policy variables do not react contemporaneously to 
the policy variables, but the latter do react to the nonpolicy variables.  He found evidence 
that monetary policy innovations indeed have weaker effects on output and inflation in 
Nigeria and Uganda in the excess-reserve regime, but have equally weak effects under 
both regimes in the CEMAC countries.  Similarly, Buigut (2009) examined monetary 
transmission in three countries (Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda) belonging to the East 
African Community (EAC).  He used a three-variable VAR approach with real output, 
inflation and a policy interest rate as endogenous variables, and a Choleski 
decomposition to identify structural shocks, ordering output first and the policy rate last 
(on the assumption that the policy rate is based on contemporaneously-observed output 
and inflation numbers).  He found that changes in policy interest rates had small and 
statistically insignificant effects on output and inflation, and concluded that monetary 
transmission is weak in these three countries.  Finally, Lungu (2008) examined monetary 
transmission in Southern Africa, using a seven-variable VAR containing industrial 
production, prices, M2, the monetary base, the central bank policy rate, the supply of 
bank loans, and bank lending and deposit rates.  Identifying monetary shocks using a 
Choleski decomposition with the central bank policy rate ordered first, he found mixed 
evidence for the bank lending channel in Botswana, Malawi, Namibia, and Zambia.  The 
general pattern was that while bank lending and deposit rates responded to innovations in 
the policy rate in the expected direction, such innovations seemed to have little effect on 
total bank lending, on output, or on prices. 
 
While these results are disturbing, the evidence does not all point in one direction 
regarding the effectiveness of the bank lending channel in LICs, even within Sub-Saharan 
Africa outside Namibia.  Ngalawa (2009), for example, using a seven-variable structural 
VAR found that policy rates had significant impacts on bank credit in Malawi, and that 
                                                 
26 In addition to banks’ preference for liquidity, Laurens (2005) argued that the transmission from policy 
instruments to market interest rates in Africa is also hindered by shallow or dormant interbank markets. 
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changes in bank credit subsequently affected both real output and inflation, confirming 
the effectiveness of both links in the transmission channel for that country.
27 
  
b. Transition economies in Central and Eastern Europe 
 
Evidence for the effectiveness of the bank lending channel has also been mixed 
outside Sub-Saharan Africa.  A useful early survey for the Central and Eastern European 
transition economies by Ganev et al. (2002) found weak evidence (using a variety of 
methodologies) for transmission from central bank policy rates to commercial bank 
lending rates in individual country studies for countries in this region, but almost no 
evidence for the effects of bank lending rates on aggregate demand. Individual country 
studies conducted subsequently in the same region found more mixed results for the link 
between policy instruments and bank lending rates.  Lyziak, Przystupa and Wrobel 
(2008), for example, used 7-variable structural VARs to investigate the link between 
monetary policy and bank loan supply in Poland, using two alternative recursive 
identification schemes which differed with respect to assumptions about the information 
that is available to monetary policymakers, as well as with respect to the nature of 
contemporaneous interactions between the exchange rate and the interest rate.  They 
found that the bank lending channel was very weak in Poland, primarily because of 
banks’ use of excess reserves to stabilize loan supply in response to monetary policy 
changes.  Benkovskis (2008) obtained a similar result for Latvia.  Jimborean (2009), 
using micro data for ten Central European transition economies, found very weak 
evidence for a link between central bank policy rates and loan growth, with such links 
being detectable only for small banks with moderate liquidity.  In contrast with these 
results, a more recent comprehensive survey for the European transition economies by 
Egert and Macdonald (2009) continued to find, as in Ganev et. al. (2002), that pass-
through from monetary policy to bank lending rates has been extensive in these countries.  
However, support for the bank lending channel remained limited by the absence of 
evidence on the links between bank lending rates and aggregate demand.   
 
c. Transition Economies in Central Asia 
 
Various studies have examined transition economies in Central Asia, though there 
appear to be no region-wide surveys comparable to those available for Central and 
Eastern Europe.  Consistent with results for the transition economies in Central and 
Eastern Europe, Dabla-Norris and Floerkermeier (2006) found that policy rates were 
transmitted to bank lending rates in Armenia, but bank lending rates appeared to have 
little effect on output.  Similarly, Samkharadze (2008) found that, while the bank lending 
channel appeared to operate in the expected direction in Georgia, the effects of bank 
interest rate changes on real output were very weak.  Looking at the reduced-form effects 
of policy changes on indicators of aggregate demand, Isakova (2008) concluded that the 
                                                 
27 However, the identification assumptions for the SVAR are questionable. They assume orthogonality of 
the structural disturbances; imposing the condition that output and consumer prices do not simultaneously 
react to monetary variables; while allowing feedback in the other direction. Moreover, Ngalawa does not 
take into account that Malawi’s exchange rate was mostly pegged during the estimation period.    28
bank lending channel has been unimportant in Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, and 
Tajikistan, even though changes in policy rates have been effectively passed through to 
money market interest rates.   
 
d. The Middle East and North Africa 
 
  There is comparatively little work on monetary transmission in Middle Eastern 
and North African (MENA) LICs. Boughrara (2008) used a VAR approach to examine 
monetary transmission in Tunisia and Morocco.  He identified monetary policy 
innovations using a Choleski identification scheme in which macro outcome variables 
were ordered first, followed by transmission variables (such as the supply of loans), and 
with the monetary policy variable (a money-market rate) ordered last, on the assumption 
that policy reacts contemporaneously to all macro variables, but does not 
contemporaneously affect any of them.   He used a Ramey (1993) approach to identifying 
the role of the bank lending channel – i.e., he contrasts the impulse response functions 
(IRFs) of prices and output to a monetary shocks in the case when bank loans were 
treated as an endogenous variable in the VAR to the responses of the same variables 
when bank lending was exogenized.  Finding significant differences between the two sets 
of IRFs in both Morocco and Tunisia, he concluded that the bank lending channel has 
been important in both cases.  Zeaei (2009) reached a similar conclusion for ten MENA 
countries using a different methodology.  Finding a negative association between policy 
rates and bank lending in cointegrating vectors estimated by dynamic least squares 
(DOLS), he concluded that changes in policy rates moved bank lending in the opposite 
direction to the change in the policy rate in these countries, at least in the short run.  
However, he did not address the second step in the transmission channel from bank 
lending to aggregate demand.  
 
e.  Asia-Pacific 
 
There is a similar scarcity of evidence for LICs from the Asia-Pacific region.  
Like Boughara, Agha et al (2005) implemented the Ramey (1993) approach to the 
identification of the role of bank lending in monetary transmission for Pakistan.  
Comparing the response of real output to a change in monetary policy when bank credit 
is allowed to respond endogenously and when it is not, they concluded that the bank 
lending channel has played an important role in transmitting monetary policy changes to 
economic activity.  Ahmad (2008) examined monetary transmission in Fiji and Papua 
New Guinea using a six-variable VAR with innovations identified via a Choleski 
decomposition with bank reserves ordered before other transmission variables, and macro 
variables ordered last.   His analysis was based on variance decompositions for output 
and prices.  He concluded that innovations in bank reserves and deposits played an 
important role in explaining output variation in Fiji, while bank loans were dominant in 
Papua New Guinea. 
 
f.  Latin America and the Caribbean 
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Finally, research on the bank lending channel in Latin America and the Caribbean 
has reached contradictory conclusions.  Kendall (2001) used six-variable VARs with 
Choleski identification to examine the first stage of transmission from monetary policy 
(in the form of changes in discount rates, required reserve ratios, and short-term Treasury 
bill rates) on bank lending rates in six Caribbean countries.   He found that responses of 
lending rates were highly heterogeneous in these countries, both with respect to 
magnitude as well as duration.   On the other hand, Duran-Viquez and Esquivel-Monge 
(2008) found complete long-run pass-through from policy rates to lending rates in Costa 
Rica.  Other authors have been able to document links from monetary policy actions to 
ultimate effects on prices and economic activity for countries in the region.  For example, 
although Robinson and Robinson (1997) do not specifically trace transmission from 
monetary policy through bank lending rates to aggregate demand, they found that 
changes in the repo rate had important short-run effects on both prices and economic 
activity in Jamaica.  More convincingly, Ramlogan (2004), using a structural VAR to 
examine monetary transmission in three Caribbean countries, found that monetary 
tightening resulted in a contraction in bank credit that was accompanied by slower 
growth and lower inflation, consistent with an effective bank lending channel operating 
in those countries. 
 
2. The exchange rate channel 
 
While most low-income countries intervene heavily in foreign exchange markets, 
there is some evidence to suggest that the exchange rate channel may be operative in at 
least some LICs that allow more scope for market determination of exchange rates. For 
example, in Kenya, which maintained a managed float during the sample period, Cheng 
(2006) used VAR techniques to find that policy-driven interest rates had a considerable 
impact on the foreign exchange value of the shilling. He found that the exchange rate 
channel accounted for about one-fourth of the variation in inflation, but suggested that the 
effect operated mostly through pass-through rather than expenditure-switching effects, 
since he found much weaker effects on real aggregate demand and economic activity.  By 
contrast, Boughrara (2008) found no role for the exchange rate channel in Morocco and 
Tunisia, Ngalawa (2009) found no significant transmission from monetary policy 
instruments to the exchange rate in Malawi, and Ahmed and Islam (2005) could not 
support the importance of an exchange rate channel in Bangladesh. 
 
In short, the systematic country-specific evidence is consistent with the cross-
country evidence: the standard channels of monetary transmission tend to be weak and 




It has long been recognized that, while the general outlines of monetary 
transmission share many common features across economies, specific channels of 
transmission are highly country-specific, and depend among other things on each 
economy’s financial structure.  There are significant differences across economies in   30
financial structure, even among those at very advanced stages of financial development.  
These differences are even more pronounced between economies at advanced stages of 
financial development and those – such as many low-income countries – that have long 
suffered from financial repression and have only recently begun the process of financial 
development.   Unfortunately, research on mechanisms of monetary transmission has 
traditionally been focused on countries with advanced financial systems, leaving a 
significant gap in our understanding of monetary transmission in contexts that are more 
typical of low-income countries.  This situation is particularly serious not only because it 
provides a more acute challenge for central banks in such countries to improve the 
credibility-flexibility tradeoff by committing themselves to deliver specific medium-term 
price level outcomes, but also because monetary policy is often the only countercyclical 
policy tool available in such countries, making its effective operation a very high priority. 
 
This paper has provided an overview of the reasons why we might expect 
monetary transmission to be different in a low-income country context from what we are 
familiar with in industrial countries.  We have argued that at lower levels of financial 
development, the transmission mechanism is likely to be dominated by the bank lending 
channel.  Yet in many low-income countries a combination of institutional deficiencies 
that restrict bank lending, as well as high levels of bank concentration, may make the 
transmission from central bank monetary policy actions to bank lending rates both weak 
and unreliable.  We have provided some simple cross-country evidence in support of this 
proposition, and our overview of the existing, more systematic, country-specific evidence 
largely comes to the same conclusion.   
 
The task at hand, therefore, is to attempt to attempt to understand how specific 
characteristics of the domestic institutional environment, and of the industrial 
organization of the domestic banking sector, affect the effectiveness and reliability of 
monetary transmission in low-income countries.  Achieving analytical clarity on this 
issue would make it possible to proceed to the empirical task of attempting to quantify 
the specific links in the monetary transmission mechanism that are operative in individual 
low-income countries.   31
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Namibia Narrative  approach 
(De Fiore (1998) and 
Morsink and 
Bayoumi (1999)); 
VAR with Cholesky 
ordering 
(i)Interest rate higher and private 
investment lower after tightening 
episodes. (ii) Changes in South 
African Reserve Bank’s policy rate 
are transmitted to lending rates and 








Descriptive  Banks extend limited credit to the 
private sector; instead they hold 30-
50% of deposits as reserves in the 
Central Bank and in the form of 
















policy variables by 
assuming that non-
policy variables do 
not react 
contemporaneously 
to policy variables 
but latter do react to 
the former.  
The impact of monetary loosening 
on credit expansion is likely to be 
limited under conditions of excess 
liquidity. 





Bank lending channel is not 
important. The effect of a monetary 
policy shock on output and inflation 
is not significant. 







Mixed evidence on the bank lending 
channel. While bank lending and 
deposit rates respond to innovations 
in the policy rate, the impact on 
prices, output and bank lending is 
limited.   37
Ngalawa (2009)  Malawi  Structural VAR  Bank lending channel is important. 
(i) an unanticipated increase in the 
bank rate of about 2.2 percent 
causes bank lending to decline, 
bottoming at 2 percent below 
baseline after 18 months. This 
response is significant between 6 
and 24 months. (ii)  a 7.2 percent 
sudden increase in reserve money 
leads to an increase in bank loans, 
peaking at 1.5 percent above 
baseline after 3 years. This response 
is not significant. (iii) an 
unexpected 5.5 percent rise in bank 
loans, on the other hand, leads to an 














Weak evidence for transmission 
from bank policy rates to bank 
lending rates and no evidence for 





Poland  Structural VAR  Bank lending channel is weak, due 




Latvia Standard  panel  level 
regression using 
bank-level data 
(i) Some banks have a statistically 
significant negative reaction to a 
domestic monetary shock, but the 
weighted average reaction of loan 
growth is not statistically 
significant. (ii) a domestic monetary 
shock has only a distribution effect 
and affects banks that are small, 
domestically owned and have lower 
liquidity or capitalization (iii) The 
bank lending channel is limited to 
the supply of lats loans, which 
dramatically reduces the importance 















balance sheet data; 
Kashyap and Stein 




Evidence for existence of a bank-
lending channel through small 
banks with moderate liquidity only; 
applies in the short-run to several, 








Banks react differently to monetary 





characteristics e.g. size, liquidity, 
capitalization, ownership structure 











(i) Pass-through from monetary 
policy key rate to short-term money 
market rates is very high or 
complete.  (ii) pass-through from 
money market rates to market 
interest rates of shorter maturity is 
also very high (iii) pass-through to 
long-term market rates is unstable 
(iv) the results are very similar to 
the findings for the euro area 




Armenia VAR;  Cholesky 
ordering 
Bank lending channel remains 
weak. Lending rate responds 
immediately and significantly to an 
unexpected change in the repo rate. 
However, output and prices do not 




Georgia VAR;  Choleski 
ordering 
Bank lending channel operates in 
the expected direction in Georgia, 
but the effects of bank interest rate 
changes on real output are very 
weak.   






The bank lending channel has been 
unimportant even though changes in 
policy rates are effectively passed 
through to market interest rates. 
Middle East and 







approach to identify 
the bank lending 
channel 
Lending channel is operative  in 
Morocco and Tunisia. A tight 
monetary policy induces a decrease 
in the quantity of bank loans, the 
effects are less pronounced in 
Morocco.  

















least square (DOLS) 
Bank lending channel is likely to be 
an effective monetary transmission 
mechanism in MENA countries. In 
particular, bank credit to the private 
sector increases with a monetary 
expansion.    39
Asia and Pacific 
 
Agha et al 
(2005) 
Pakistan  VAR; Ramey (1993) 
to identify the bank 
lending channel 
Bank lending channel has played an 
important role in transmitting 
monetary policy changes to 
economic activity in Pakistan  




Innovations in bank reserves and 
Deposits) play an important role in 
explaining output variation in Fiji, 
while bank loans are dominant in 




Jamaica VAR;  Choleski 
ordering 
(i) Following a unit shock to the 
reverse repo, the inflation rate 
decelerates within two months by 
approximately 0.1 percent per 
month.  (ii) There are very strong, 
albeit temporary, real sector effects, 
as real economic activity declines 
by approximately 2.0 percent in 
four months. 
Kendall (2001)  Caribbean    VAR; Choleski 
ordering 
(i) Divergence in lending rate 
responses across the region to 
similar monetary policy shocks. The 
differences in response relate not 
only to the magnitude but also to 
the duration of the response. (ii) 
There can also be differences in the 









Structural VAR  (i) In each country except Barbados 
a shock to loans accounts for over 
28 per cent of the variance in output 
over the long run. (ii) In Barbados 
although credit shocks are not as 
important as exchange rate shocks 
at any time horizon, a shock to 
loans retains a large role in 
explaining output variability 
compared to the role of money 
shocks. (ii) In Jamaica credit shocks 
are more important in the long run 
while exchange rate shocks are 
more important in the short to 
medium term. (iii) In Trinidad and 
Tobago credit shocks are at least as 
important as the exchange rate early 







Costa Rica  Non-linear 
asymmetric VECM 
(i) Evidence supporting the 
hypothesis of a complete pass-
through of the policy rate in the 
long run. (ii) Since the introduction 
of the administrated band exchange 
rate system (October 2006) banks 
react faster in the short run to 
movements of policy rate. (iii) there 
is no evidence of an asymmetric 
reaction of retail interest rates to 
movements of policy rate (iv) On   40
average, loan and deposit rates take 
9.4 and 5 months respectively to 
fully pass a shock of policy rate. 
These average times are reduced to 
3.5 and 2 towards the end of the 
sample. (v) private Banks pass a 
larger portion of any given 
movement of policy rate than State 
owned ones, but take more time to 
fully do so.  
 
Note. In this table, we use a broad definition of LICs to include all countries classified as developing in 
Rogoff et. al., 2004. 
 